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NOTES
The Power of Dispensation in Administrative Law-A Critical Survey
The rapid growth of administrative law in this country and in England
is one of the romances of legal history.' Within the span of half a century,
the term "administrative law", which had been virtually unknown to the
English-speaking bar, has come to denote a most fertile field for legal

productivity.
i. For an excellent, up-to-date account of this growth, see LANDIs, THE ADmINisSee also DiCxiNSON, ADmiNISTRATvE JUSTICE AND THE
TRATIE PROCESS (1938).
SUPREMACY OF LAW (1927) ; FREUND, etc., THE GROWTH OF AmERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1923) ; Berle, The Expansion of American Administrative Law (917) 30
HARv. L. REV. 43o; Dicey, The Development of Administrative Law in England (igi)
31 L. Q. REv. 148; Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law (1927) 75 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 614; Rosenberry, Administrative Law and the Constitution (1929) 23 Am. POL.
ScI. REV. 32; cf. Garner, French Administrative Law (924) 33 YALE L. J. 597.
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The exigencies of a vastly complicated industrialized modem society,
which find satisfaction in the greater control by government of public
utilities, insurance, banking, commerce, finance, industry, labor, the professions, health and morals, are responsible for the genesis of the myriad administrative agencies now in existence and for the large discretionary
powers which have been lodged therein.2 Consequently, the courts have
been unwilling, perhaps helpless, to resist the formidable advance of administrative powers ground out by Congress and state legislatures. Traditional legal tenets, such as the doctrine of separation of powers, and its
corollary, expressed by the maxim "delegata potestas non potest delegari",
have given ground before the onslaught.3
Although the courts have, in general, been amenable to the new order
of things, the development of administrative law has been definitely retarded, in some respects, by the judiciary. This is particularly true in
reference to the problem of what discretionary powers may be vested in the
administrative branch of the government.
Generally speaking, it may be said that the legislature may delegate a
power of discretion if it sets up adequate standards and statements of policy
to guide the administrative agency in exercising this discretion. Certain
procedural safeguards, such as hearings and findings, are also often required.
Actually, this statement of the law means little. As will appear from
the cases subsequently to be discussed, that which a given court will consider to be a "standard", which it will hold to be "adequate", in sum, that
which will be deemed a valid delegation, is entirely unpredictable. One
cause of the present confusion 4 is the judicial attempt to find legal justification for the desired result solely in several hackneyed "rules", which originally were dicta in some early decisions rendered while the courts were
still under the powerful influence and pressure of the old doctrines aforementioned, and which therefore contained language that to-day is meaningless and confusing.5 Furthermore, as far as legal analysis is concerned, the
judiciary has made little attempt at an analytical classification of the varied
administrative discretionary powers. Principles governing the delegation
See supra note I, especially LANDIS, op cit. supra note I, I-I6.
3. Haines, Effects of the Growth of Administrative Law upon Traditional AngloAmerican Legal Theories and Practices (1932) 26 Am. POL. ScL REv. 875. Cf. Green,
Separation of Governmental Powers (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 369. Generally, see 4
2.

SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(1938) 168-352.

4. Some courts are beginning to see the muddle. Thus, in Franklin Process Co. v.
Hoosac Mills Corp., 8 F. Supp. 552, 558 (D. Mass. 1934), it was said: "The courts
have not as yet clearly defined the line between lawful and unlawful delegation of legislative power." Again, in Butler v. United States, 78 F. (2d) I, 7 (C. C. A. Ist, 1935),
the court observed that "the line between grants of legislative powers and the authority
to perform a purely administrative function as drawn in the decisions may at first blush
appear wavy instead of straight, notwithstanding the rule has been often definitely
stated." Note the conflicting language. One court concedes that there may be a lawful
legislative delegation, the other impliedly denies this.
5. A currently popular "rule" often cited originated as dictum in Cincinnati, etc.,
R. R. v. Commissioners, I Ohio St. 77, 88 (1852). It states that: "The true distinction,
therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as
to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot
be done; to the latter no objection can be made."
To Professor Ernst Freund, "this has always seemed to be a distinction without a
difference; but in view of the elusiveness of the criterion, it is not surprising that the
court easily persuades itself that all its decisions sustaining delegated discretion fall on
one side of the distinction, and all its decisions against the validity of the delegation, on
the other." Freund, Power of Zoning Boards of Appeals to Grant Variations (1931)
20 NAT. MuNic. Rzv. 537.
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of these powers are stated without variation whether a licensing power or a
rule-making power be involved. Similarly, it seems to matter little that
the field of operation of a given power may vary from one case to another.
It is submitted that such a situation is unfortunate from both the legal and
social viewpoints. If administrative law is to grow, if better justice is to
be achieved, there is a fundamental need for a more analytic approach.
A little more than a decade ago, Professor Frankfurter, in discussing
the task of administrative law,0 cautioned that: "In administrative law we
are dealing pre-eminently with law in the making; with fluid tendencies and
tentative traditions. Here we must be especially wary against the danger
of premature synthesis, of sterile generalization unnourished by the realities
of 'law in action'."
Although the growth of administrative law since then has been greatly
accelerated, the admonition should not go unheeded even to-day. Still, the
time seems ripe for extended investigations into the nature and merit of
the various administrative powers, of the extent to which they are used and
of the treatment accorded them by the courts. The accumulation of such
studies should do much in influencing the bench and bar to grant problems
in administrative discretion a more analytic, systematic, and intelligent
treatment. 7 It is the purpose of this article to attempt one such study-a
survey and analysis of the use of the dispensing power in American administrative law.

I.

NATURE OF THE DISPENSING POWER

The late Professor Ernst Freund, whose "pioneer scholarship . . .
long remained caviar" to the legal profession,' and who apparently has been
the only American writer to treat of the dispensing power as such,0 considered the power as one of five "administrative determinative powers".1
He offered no refined definition of this power, but stated that "where the
law contemplates that a general policy of prohibition may have to be relaxed
under exceptional circumstances, it may vest an appropriate dispensing
power in administrative authorities, to be exercised either from case to case
or by, general rule.. .

.":"

An inquiry into the origin of the dispensing

power and into its subsequent history may aid us in formulating an adequate definition and in gaining a fuller appreciation of its nature.
According to Maitland, at the end of the Middle Ages in England,
the dispensing power was part of the king's inheritance-a royal prerogative.' 2 By its authority he might exempt particular persons, under special
circumstances, from the operation of a penal statute. This, he urges, was
quite different in theory from the power of suspension, the occasional exercise of which had the effect of nullifying the entire operation of a statute
6. Frankfurter, supra note i, at 61g.
7. "Loose use of terms and the necessity of resorting to legal fictions on the part
of American courts in many cases conduces to further confusion. . . . A franker acceptance of administrative legislation by American courts and a more systematic classification of different types of administrative orders would conduce to greater justice,
more efficient government, and, it may be added in regard to systematic classification,
that it would result in a more carefully worked out differentiation of procedures to be
applied when administrative authorities are exercising different powers." Weeks, Legislative Powers versus Delegated Legislative Power (1937) 25 GEO. L. J. 314, 327.
8. Frankfurter, supra note i, at 616.
9. See FREUND, AnINISTRArIVE Powms OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1928) 17,
128-135.

io. The enabling, directing, examining and summary powers complete the group.
ii.

FREUND, op. cit. supra note 9, at 17.

See also BouvIER, LAW DIcrIONARY (8th

ed. 1914) 888; 7 ENCYCLOP2MDIA BRITANNICA (W4th ed. 1929) 423.
12. MAITLAND, THE CoNsTITUTIoNAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1926)

188, 3O2-3O5.
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"so that persons in general might treat it as being non-existent". 13 The
English courts found little difficulty in distinguishing a dispensation from
a pardon, which is a relief, after conviction, from punishment. More problematic, however, was the distinguishing of a license, although such a distinction was attempted. 4
The power of dispensation, which was probably borrowed from the
papal practice of issuing bulls "non obstante any law to the contrary",
seems to have had its beginning in England in the reign of Henry III, and
its exercise was frequent throughout the Plantagenet period. To quote Sir
William Anson, "the language of ancient statutes was usually brief and
careless, with few of those attempts to regulate prospective contingencies,
which, even with our pretended modern caution, are often so imperfect . . .
[and since] . . . the [Parliamentary] sessions were never regular, sometimes interrupted for several years, there was a kind of necessity . . . in
deviating occasionally from the rigours of a general prohibition." 1s Nevertheless, numerous attempts to restrain the dispensing power were made
both by Parliament and by the courts, with but little success.' 6
Strong opposition to the use of this power arose in the seventeenth
century due to its excessive abuse by the Stuarts, whose reign by "divine
right" implied the uncontrolled discretion to set aside a law deemed adverse
to the interests of the kingdom.' 7 Popular patience finally was exhausted
when, in 1687, James II, in order to free himself from the necessity of
granting dispensations in individual cases, attempted to suspend all the
penal laws relating to religion.' 8 The demise of the dispensing and suspending powers as royal prerogatives occurred two years later with the enactment of the Bill of Rights, abolishing the power of suspension and invalidating the dispensing power "as it hathe been assumed and exercised
of late".' 9 No dispensation of any statute or part thereof might be made,
it declared, unless Parliament expressly provided for such in the statute.
Thus, the power of dispensation to-day finds much employment in England,
but only through statutory authorization."
Neither the dispensing nor suspending powers are mentioned in the
Constitution of the United States, and the records of the constitutional conventions do not indicate that they were there discussed. Certainly all sorts
of royal prerogative were held in disfavor. But the interesting question
arises as to whether the framers of the Constitution contemplated that Congress might grant to the Executive a dispensing power in reference to a
particular statute. The question becomes even more interesting when it is
considered that although some of the state constitutions prohibit the exercise of the power of "suspending laws . . . unless by the legislature or by
its authority", 2 they do not mention the power of dispensation. Perhaps
13. "

.

.

the dispensing power might be so lavishly used that it would practically

operate to suspend the laws." Id. at 304. It would seem that the term "dispensing
power" was used sometimes to include the power of suspension. See 2 TAYLOR, ORIGIN
AND GROWTH OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION (1898) 397.
14. See BROOM, CONsTITuTIONAL LAw (1866) 495.
15. I ANSON, LAW

AND CUSTOM OF THE CONsTITUTIoN

16. See BRooM,

(5th ed. 1922) 347.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1866)
493-508; TASWELL-LANGMEAD,
ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (6th ed. 1905) 251.
17. Accord: Godden v. Hales, 2 Shower 475, 89 Eng. Rep. 1050.

I8. ANSON, op. cit. supra note 15, at 353.
19. I WILL. & MARY, Sess. 2, c. 2 (1689).
20. See WILLIS, THE PARLIAMENTARY PowEas OF ENGLISH GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (1933) 21, 146, 149, 162-164

21. PA.

CONST.

art. I, §

trative Agencies in Texas

12.

(1937)

See also Ray, Delegation of Power to State Adinins16 TEX. L. REV. 20, 22.
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"suspending" was meant to include "dispensing". However, in Kendall v.
United States, 22 the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through
Mr. Justice Thompson, declared:
"To contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see
the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution,
is a novel construction of the Constitution, and entirely inadmissible."
"This is a doctrine that cannot receive the sanction of this Court. It
would be vesting in the President a dispensing power, which has no
countenance for its support in any part of the Constitution; and is
asserting a principle, which, if carried out in its results, to all cases
falling within it, would be clothing the President with a power entirely
to control the legislation of Congress and paralyze the administration
of justice." [Italics supplied.]
when an American
This is the only occasion, as far as could be ascertained,
28
court has employed the term "dispensing power". 3
What then can be said to be the meaning of "power of dispensation"?
For the purposes of this article, it will mean the power of an administrative
agency to make exemptions, variations,and extensions, in connection with
one or more provisions of a given statute, in a particular case or class of
cases, when, in the discretion of the administrative, circumstances, usually
exceptional in nature, warrant such dispensation; provided, the exercise
of the power does not violate the terms of its creation. Thus defined, the
power is slightly broader in scope than heretofore considered, but there is
justification for the change, it is believed, in view of the cases herein collected. Further generalizations, at this point, as to the nature of and the
justification for the dispensing power would not only be premature, but
would closely resemble "sterile generalizations unnourished by the realities
of 'law in action'."
Even as the English were troubled in attempting to distinguish between
a dispensationand a license, so shall we be. In outward form and in legal
terminology, the dispensing and licensing powers are often indistinguishable.
However,, they differ principally in their purposes and functions. Freund
explains that: ". . . the licensing power sets or assumes a standard, while
the dispensing power sanctions a deviation from a standard". 24 Perhaps the
difference may better be expressed in a series of propositions: (i) The dispensation relieves, the license enables; (2) a license is intended to be granted
in the normal situation where certain requirements have been met; a dispensation, in the extraordinary situation; as a corollary, (3) the licensing
power is generally expected to be exercised more frequently than the dispensing power; finally, (4) the result of the exercise of the licensing power
usually can be more accurately pre-determined than in the case of the dispensing power.
The ensuing discussion will not involve situations where (i) the statute makes specific exemptions; (2) the amount of discretion permitted the
administrative is so negligible as to involve no real problem; (3) the dispensing power is exercised by a court; 25 or where (4) an administrative
22. 12 Peters 524, 613 (U. S. 1838).
23. Query whether the court was using it in its limited meaning?
24. FREuND, op. cit. supra note 9, at 129.
25. E. g., in PA. STAT. AxN. (Purdon, I93O) tit 48, § 19, the Orphans' Court is
given discretion to dispense "in special cases" with certain age requirements in connection with marriage licenses.

2o6

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

agency is empowered to vary2 and make exceptions from its own rules, 28 or
the rules of another agency. ?
II. THE APPROACH
Just as individual treatment of the various component powers is essential for a complete understanding of the problem of administrative discretion, in order to secure a true picture of the dispensing power, its nature
and operation, we must consider this power with reference to different
areas of activity.28 Questions of scope and degree of discretion together
with the number of safeguards which should be attached to the power
properly can be decided only with reference to operative facts. 29 Consequently, cases and statutes must be classified according to subject matter
and purpose. Concededly, classifications contained herein will not cover
the field in toto. Moreover, some may be narrower in scope than others;
they may not be mutually exclusive; and, all phases of one classification
may not be discussed. Obviously, only the most important representative
illustrations can be included. However, it is believed that satisfactory
sampling will be had in reference both to categories and material contained therein.
As this exploratory survey proceeds, the following leading questions
which may give point to the current discussion, should be kept in mind:
Is the power of dispensation legislative or executive in nature? Is it meaningful and helpful to call it an administrative power? Is use of the term
"contingent" or "conditional legislation" of aid? If it is an executive
power, how does it compare with the royal prerogative? Is it an inherently
executive or administrative function, or does it become either executive
or administrative by designation of the legislature? If it is deemed "quasilegislative" in nature, can the power then be considered as properly belonging to the executive? Assuming it to be a legislative power, is it the kind
that may be delegated? Will this depend upon whether satisfactory "standards" have been set up? Can one satisfactory standard be formulated to
guide all dispensing powers? Must the standards vary? Is it possible to
set up standards at all in reference to this power? Is it of value to do so?
Assuming that the last two questions are answered affirmatively, what
should be the general character of these standards? What safeguards or
checks, if any, can and should be attached to the power of dispensation?
Should this depend upon the specific type of power involved? Should the
use of the administrative dispensing power be encouraged or discouraged?
How can this best be done? What factors operate to make for its increasing or decreasing employment?
These questions, and many more, will gather meaning as the cases
unfold themselves. No systematic attempt will be made to answer all, or
even many of them, in reference to each set of facts. Some are unanswerable at this time. Others, though interesting, are not of vital significance.
Above all, it should be emphasized that our primary purpose is to focus
attention on the power of dispensation as an important administrative power
of discretion, and to reveal the extent of the utilization of this power both
in the past and present.
26. A study of this power would prove interesting, although the problems involved
would not be too difficult. Generally, the power is readily upheld. See Schumer v.
Caplin, 241 N. Y. 346, i5o N. E. 139 (1925).
220

27. E. g., see State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472,
N. W. 929 (1928). Distinguish the zoning ordinance situation, infra p. :25.
28. See Rosenberry, J., now Chief Justice, id. at 5o9, 22o N. W. at 943.
29. See LANDIS, op. cit. supra note I, at 55.
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Since the term "dispensing power" is not yet a part of the judicial
vocabulary, and, since courts rarely differentiate administrative powers,
the decisions cannot be looked to for nice delineations of the power of
dispensation. But the pulse of this power in action will be felt, and it is
this which we seek.

III. THE POWER OF DISPENSATION IN ACTION
(a) Foreign Commerce
Not until 1892 did a case involving the use of a dispensing power come
before the Supreme Court of the United States. However, prior to that
time, Congress had defegated, by numerous enactments, both the dispensing
and suspending powers 80 with reference to foreign trade. The validity of
these acts never was challenged inasmuch as they were considered to involve
contingent legislation and not delegation of legislative power.31 In most
instances, this assumption was justified because the delegate, the President,
was only authorized to proclaim the existence of some easily ascertained
facts or conditions.3 2 However, in 1866, a remarkably wide discretionary
power of dispensation was granted the Secretary of the Treasury. Congress, in prohibiting the importation of any foreign neat cattle into the
United States, provided that the operation of this act should be "suspended"
as to any foreign country or part of it, whenever the Secretary should officially determine, and give public notice thereof, that such importation would
not tend to the introduction or spread of contagious or infectious diseases
among the cattle of the United States. 8
In the celebrated case of Field v. Clark,3 4 the Supreme Court of the
United States first passed upon the constitutionality of a dispensing power.
Section 3 of the McKinley Tariff of 189o,11 "with a view to secure reciprocal
trade", had authorized the President to "suspend . . . for such time as he

shall deem just", the provisions of the Act relating to the free introduction
of certain foreign articles into the United States as to any country imposing
duties on exports of the United States, which duties, "in view of the free
introduction" of the foreign articles "he may deem to be reciprocallyunequal
and unreasonable." The Court, in upholding the constitutionality of this
provision, admittedly was-impressed by the numerous administrative discretionary powers which previously had been given to the Executive by
Congress. Denying that the President had been delegated legislative
powers, which the Court felt would not be permissible, he was declared to
be a mere agent of Congress to ascertain and declare the event or contingency upon which its expressed will was to take effect. Further, "he
may deem", indicated no actual discretion; his discretion appeared only in
3o. For suspending powers granted the President, see i STAT. 565, 566 (1798) ; I
STAT. 613, 615 (I799) ; 2 STAT. 411 (i8o6).

31. See ComEa, LxaISLATIW FuxcnoNs OF NATIOxAL ADmmISTRATIE AUTHORITIES (1927)

64-73; Baesler, A Suggested Classificationof the Decisions on Delegation

of Legislative Power (1935) 15 B. U. L. REv. 507, 521.
32. Thus in 3 STAT. 224 (I85), Congress provided that certain acts, which imposed discriminating duties on importations from foreign countries, should be repealed
in favor of any foreign nation "whenever the President . . . shall be satisfied that
the discriminating or countervailing duties of such foreign nation, so far as they operate
to the disadvantage of the United States," had been abolished. See also 3 STAT. 361
(1817); 4 STAT. 3 (1824); 4 STAT. 308 (1828); 4 STAT. 425 (1830).
33. 14 STAT. 3 (1866) (also empowered the President to suspend entirely upon determination that danger was over).
34. 143 U. S. 649 (892).
35. 26 STAT. 567, 62 (i8go).

208

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

86
It should be
determining the duration of the "suspension" of the law.
noted that no "standards" existed to guide the President in determining
which duties were "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable". Furthermore,
a contemporary court would hardly deny that determination of reasonableness is a matter involving discretion. But the Court, convinced of the prac37
tical necessity for sustaining this grant of power, apparently did not see
discretionary.
deemed
were
the
power
if
how this could be done
Thirty years later, a far broader dispensing power was entrusted to
the Chief Executive. The McKinley Tariff had fixed a schedule of duties
to become effective if any dispensations were made, but Section 315 of the
Flexible Tariff Act of 1922's permitted the President himself to vary the
duties fixed in the Act in order to equalize differences which, upon investigation, he should find and ascertain between the costs of producing at home
and in competing foreign countries the kind of articles to which such duties
applied. It was stipulated, however, that the total variation in either direction should not exceed 50 per cent. of the rates specified by the Act. Furthermore, specified factors were to be considered by the President "insofar
as he finds it practicable". A safeguard in the form of an investigation by
the United States Tariff Commission, in connection with which public
notice and hearings were required, was made a condition precedent to final
executive action by the President.
The constitutionality of these provisions was upheld in Hampton, Jr.,
& Co. v. United States,s9 wherein the Supreme Court laid down the "common sense" and "intelligible principle" doctrines, only the latter of which
generally has been recognized. Chief Justice Taft, speaking for a unanimous court, was of the opinion that in determining what one branch of the
government may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent
and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense
and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination. In the
instant case, Congress had realized that changing conditions would cause
the difference "to vary in such a way that some readjustments would be
necessary to give effect to the principle on which the statute proceeds."
Congress did not think itself able to make the necessary variations. Therefore, expediency demanded that the Executive's assistance be sought. The
Court concluded that:
"If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation
of legislative power . . . (The Court thought that such a principle
had been established.) . . . If it is thought wise to vary the customs
duties according to changing conditions of production at home and
abroad, it may authorize the Chief Executive to carry out this purpose,
with the advisory assistance of a Tariff Commission appointed under
Congressional authority. This conclusion is amply sustained by a case
in which there was no advisory commission furnished the Presidenta case to which this Court gave the fullest consideration nearly forty
years ago (citing Field v. Clark)." [Italics supplied.] 40

36. Dissenting, two justices held the section invalid as a delegation of legislative
power.
37. See ComER, op. cit. supra note 31, at 78, 79.
38. 42 STAT. 858, 941 (1922), repealed by 46 STAT. 701, 19 U. S. C. A. § 1336
(937) (retaining flexibility feature).
39. 276 U. S. 394 (1928).
40. Id. at 409.
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Thus, the Court impliedly recognized that which had been denied in Field
v. Clark, namely, that there may be a constitutional delegation of legislative
power.4 1 Moreover, the Court apparently was favorably impressed by the
fact that the Tariff Commission, a check upon the President's power to
comment
vary,4 2 had been established by Congress. President Hoover's
43
upon the nature of this power, which has been footnoted, strengthens the
belief that it is truly a power of dispensation.
(b) Revenue
poier-exemption, variation and extendispensing
of
types
All three
sion-have found application in connection with revenue. Thus, the
Customs Administrative Act of x938 44 empowers collectors of customs "to
admit articles free of duty when the expense and inconvenience of collecting
the duty accruing thereon would be disproportionateto the amount of such
duty." However, the aggregate value of articles imported by one person
payment of duty may not exceed a stated
on one day and exempted from
45
provides that if the Board of Finance and
statute
Pennsylvania
A
sum.
Revenue finds, upon petition, that there is a state which, imposing no tax
upon manufacturers of certain liquors which are shipped outside the state,
is in competition with Pennsylvania in the production of these liquors, then
certain exemptions shall be permitted from the tax levied on such manufac-

turers.

46
In Livesay v. DeArnond, the Oregon Supreme Court declared valid
of the state to waive or reduce, at its
boards
county
a statute authorizing
discretion, penalties and interest on certain delinquent taxes, whenever the
boards should find that "such action would facilitate the payment of such
taxes." The court noted that the general purpose of the act was to reduce
delinquencies, to induce the property owner to pay his taxes, and to enable
him to retain his property. With the writing of this purpose into the act,
its
the legislative power (which could not be delegated) had completed as
executive
an
"was
court,
the
thought
involved,
discretion
The
course.
distinguished from a legislative function." Furthermore, these variations
(waivers) were to apply to a class of cases
(reductions) and exemptions
47

and not from case to case.
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this in Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co.
41. Mr. Justice Cardozo emphasized
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the
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where
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294,
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process". But see
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under
power
President's
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declared
the court, citing the Hampton case,
not legislative in character.
of the Commis42. The President was not required to follow the recommendations
deter any arbitrary
sion, but the public hearings and attendant publicity probably would
13
exercise of power. Cf. Welch, The Flexible Provisions of the Tariff Act (1927)
VA. L. Ray. 206, 222-228.
progressive steps taken in tariff mak43. "The flexible provision is one of the most
there shall be no remedy to isolated
that
wrong
entirely
is
It
history.
our
all
in
ing
adequately protect certain incases of inJustice that may arise through the failure to wich
may prove higher than
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opportunity
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4080

(1929); FRANKFURTER AND DAvIsoN, CASES

488-490.
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1321 (Supp. 1938).
47, § 765 (b).
45. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit.
46. 131 Ore. 563, 284 Pac. 66 (1930).
upheld, in an amazing opinion,
47. A sweeping power to suspend certain taxes was
in State ex rel. Porterie v. Grosjean, 182 La. 298, 161 So. 871 (935).

44. 52 STAT. 1081, 19 U. S. C. A. §
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Provisions for extension of time for payment of taxes are common.
Thus the Secretary of the Treasury has been authorized by Congress 48 to
permit postponement up to i8o days of payment of three-quarters of the
amount of processing taxes due. Similarly, Section 503 of the Federal
Revenue Act of r938,4 9 provides that where the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue finds that the payment on the due date of any part of an estate
tax "would impose undue hardship upon the estate", he may extend the
time for such payment, but for not more than ten years.
(c) Public Utilities °
It has been in the field of public utility regulation that administrative
powers have received their greatest exercise. Therefore, inquiry into this
field may reveal enlightening considerations with respect to the power of
dispensation.
Rates: The "long-and-short-haul" clause of the Interstate Commerce
.Act1 prohibited the charging of a higher rate for a shorter haul than for
a longer one over the same route. Recognizing that a rigid application of
this rule would not under all circumstances be wise or feasible, 52 it was
provided that the Interstate Commerce Commission could, after application
by common carrier and investigation, exempt such carrier "in special cases"
from operation of the rule, from time to time prescribing the extent of the
relief. In the IntermountainRate Cases,8 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that this was not a delegation of legislative power which Congress was incompetent to make. Crisply, the Court announced that the
contention to the contrary was "without merit". Similar applications of
the power of dispensation are found in several Pennsylvania statutes. 4
Consolidation and Related Arrangements: The case of Lehigh Valley
R. R. v. United States5 5 is interesting not merely because it sustained the
grant of a dispensing power, but also for the. light that it sheds upon the
nature of the power. Section ii of the Panama Canal Act 5" made it
unlawful for a common interest to exist between a carrier by water and a
railroad carrier, if they do "or may compete for traffic." But it was provided that if the Interstate Commerce Commission should be of the opinion
that any such existing specified service by water was being operated "in
the interest of the public" and was "of advantage to the convenience and
commerce of the people", and that such extension would not affect competition on the route by water under consideration, then the Commission
might extend the time during which such service by water might continue
to be operated. A three-judge federal district court of Pennsylvania, in
upholding the constitutionality of this last provision, declared this to be
. . a favor granted to the carriers in exceptional cases, and . . . not

the invasion of a right. If they had a right to be invaded, it was the right
of common control; but this (it is conceded) was lawfully taken away, and
48. 49 STAT. 770 (935), 7U. S. C.A.§61g (Supp. 1938).
49. 52 STAT. 564, 26 U. S. C. A. § 422a (Supp. 1938).
o. Regulation of securities of public utilities will be discussed in the next section.
51. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), amended by 36 STAT. 547 (igio), 49 U. S. C. A. §4
(1929).
52. See i SHARImAN,THE INTERSTATE COMmERCE COMMISSI0931)

54
53. 234 U. S.476 (1914).
54. See PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1938) tit. 15, §§ 2665, 2666 (variation of plank
road company tolls) ; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 66, § 1309 (dispensation of required notice of reduction of carrier charges).
55. 234 Fed. 682 (E. D. Pa. 1916), aff'd on other grounds, 243 U. S.412 (igi6).
56. 37 STAT. 560, 567 (1912).
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the carrier can hardly criticize the terms on which the sovereign sees fit
to restore it as a matter of grace." [Italics supplied.] 57
The significance of this rationale cannot be over-emphasized. Since
the dispensing power usually accompanies an invasion by the government
of a right, the power should always be sustained, to apply this court's theory,
inasmuch as the restoration of a right, being a matter of grace, is uncriticizable. Though it be ingenious and have the tacit approval of Professor
Freund, s it may be queried whether such a broad generalization can be
supported.
In New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States,0 the question
arose as to whether Congress could empower the I. C. C. to allow one
carrier to acquire control of another when of the opinion that this would
be in the public interest, thus relieving such carriers from operation of the
anti-trust laws. The Supreme Court of the United States called this delegation of authority constitutional. The criterion, "public interest" was held
to be sufficiently definite in view of the purpose of the Act, the requirement
it imposed, and the context of the provision.
Miscellaneous: Can a legislature, which has required public utilities
to pay the expenses of an investigation of their affairs by a public service
commission, empower the commission to exempt from this requirement any
public utility after finding that "public interest" so requires? The Wisconsin Supreme Court gave an affirmative answer in Wisconsin Telephone Co.
v. Public Service Comm. 0 In an unprecedented decision, the court held,
that although "public interest" would be ascertainable, no such standard is
really necessary where, as here, an administrative rather than legislative
power is delegated."'
The "public interest" standard was also involved in People v. Ulster &
Delaware R. R., 2 where railroad commissioners were empowered to grant
exemptions from a requirement that under certain conditions railroad lines
be extended, if in their opinion, the "public interest" did not require such
extension. This was not deemed a delegation of legislative power because
the legislature "simply instituted an ex parte inquiry to determine its own
future action."
With regard to relations between public utilities and affiliates, the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Law 63 provides that the Commission may exempt any class of contracts or donations from the requirement that all contracts or donations arranged between the utility and its affiliate be subject
to prior approval of the Commission. It should be noted that this provision contains no standard.
(d) Securities
"Blue Sky Laws" and laws similar in purpose, aiming to protect the
investor, usually provide that securities must be registered with the appropriate commission. Such a requirement was contained in Section 6oi (a)
of the Public Utility Law of Pennsylvania. It was provided, however, that
the commission "may exempt public utilities . . . as to any class of secu57. 234 Fed. 682, 698 (E. D. Pa. 1916).
58. See FREuND, op. cit. supra note 9, at 134.
59. 287 U. S. 12 (1932), aff'g, 54 F. (2d) 122 (S. D. N. Y. i93i).
589, 24o N. W. 411 (1932), io N. Y. U. L. Q. Rv. 76, 8 Wis. L.
206 Wis.
REv.6o.
176-18o
(0933)-.
6t. The court declared that there is a delegation of administrative and not legislative power where a commission is empowered to make reasonable determinations,
subject to judicial review, upon situations as they arise.
62. 128 N. Y. 240, 28 N. E. 635 (I89I).
63. PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 66, § 1272.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

212

rities" from this'requirement. 64

In the recent case of York Rys. v. Dris-

coll,65 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held this delegation of power to be
unconstitutional. The court observed merely that "Principles prohibiting
the delegation of legislative power forbid the grant to a legislative body of
the power to prescribe which securities come within the Act and which
do not. .

.

. Such a power would enable the Commission to nullify the

section. This is not permissible under our constitutional provisions." 66
In the York case, the exemption provision did not set forth a standard.
But this was also true in the converse situation in Northwest Bancorporation v. Benson,67 where the power involved was sustained. There, an
administrative body was authorized to suspend temporarily or wholly revoke the exempt status, in reference to registration, of certain securities
which had been exempted by the Act. A federal district court of Minnesota held that there was no unconstitutional delegation even though the provision did not specify the grounds or procedure to govern suspension or
revocation of the exempt status of securities by the administrative. It was
the court's opinion that the rest of the Act which gave the administrative
other powers over securities and which, in general, indicated that the purpose of the Act was to protect the public from fraud, was sufficient qualification of the power to suspend. This decision was affirmed, without opinion, by the Supreme Court of the United States. Previously, when that
Court had occasion to consider a dispensing power similar to the one in
the York
case, it had minimized its importance. For, in Merrick v. Halsey
& Co.,68 where the constitutionality of the Michigan Blue Sky Law was
in question, the Court held that permitting the state securities commission,
in its discretion, to exempt from the law securities which were listed in
any standard manual of information approved by the. commission was not
an unlawful delegation of power; that this was but a subordinate provision
"'only ancillary or convenient to the main purpose" and should not be given
too much importance. The Court was not convinced that the commission
had been given arbitrary discretion and power over the existence or extinction of business for "there is a presumption against wanton action by the
commission, and if there should be such disregard of duty a remedy in the
courts is explicitly given, and if it were not given it would necessarily be
implied."
In view of the conflicting precedents, it is speculative whether some of
the hitherto uncontested provisions of three important federal securities
acts are constitutional. Section 3 (b) of the Securities Act of 1933 69 empowers the administrative to exempt any class of securities from the registration requirements, if it finds that the enforcement of the requirement
with respect to such securities "is not necessary in the public interest and
for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or
the limited character of the public offering. . .

But such exemption

."

may not be granted when the issue exceeds $ioo,ooo.

Section 3

64. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 66, § 1241.
pensing power of extension.

See §

(12)

1243

of the

for a dis-

65. 20o Atl. 864 (Pa. 1938).

66. Id. at 865. Simultaneously, the court held the 44-hour labor law invalid in
Holgate v. Bashore, 2oo Atl. 672 (Pa. 1938), discussed infra, p. 213, wherein it expanded its views on delegation.
67. 6 F. Supp. 704 (D. Minn. I934), aff'd without opInion, 292 U. S. 6o6 (1934).
68. 242 U. S. 568 (1917).
69. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), i5 U. S. C. A. § 77a (Supp. 1937). In Coplin v. United
States, 88 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), cert. denied, 301 U. S. 703 (I937), the
court held the Act "as a whole" constitutional, but the validity of § 3 (b) had not been
separately attacked or discussed. Cf. LANDIS, op. Cit. supra note I, at 53.
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 70 permits the exemption from any provisions of the Act, by the Secretary of the Treasury, of securities of corporations in which the government has an interest, and, by the Commission,
of any other securities, upon a finding that such exemption is "necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
This test, plus that of practicability, is also laid down in Section 5 (2) of
the Act 7 1 which permits the Commission to exempt from registration requirements, exchanges which transact a limited volume of business. Finally,
Section 3 (d) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 72 empowers the S. E. C. to exempt from any provision of the Act any specified
class of subsidiary companies or affiliates "if and to the extent that it deems
the exemption necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or consumers and not contrary to the purposes of this
title." On the basis of previous decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States these dispensing powers would seem to be constitutional.
Query, what effect will the recent Pennsylvania decision have should the
validity of these provisions be challenged?
(e) Labor
At the moment there is no area of activity giving so much prominence
to the dispensing power as the field of maximum hours legislation. The
climax was reached recently when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
73
declared the Pennsylvania 44-Hour Week Law
Holgate Bros. v. Bashore,
unconstitutional because of an invalid delegation of the power of dispensation.7 4 The fatal Section 2 (b) provided that: "Where the strict application of the schedule of hours provided for by this section,7 5 imposes an
unnecessary hardship and violates the intent and purpose of this Act, the
Department of Labor and Industry, with the approval of the Industrial
Board, may make, alter, amend and repeal general rules and regulations
[Italics sup"
prescribing variationsfrom said schedule of hours ...
plied.] 71
The court first stated the general rule that the legislature may delegate
the duty to make effective a legislative policy, if primary standards to guide
the administrative have been established. It then proceeded to find Section
2 (b) invalid because it did not provide (i) a primary standard, nor (2)
any "restraint", "limits" or "boundaries"-in short, safeguards-such as
"hearings, findings of fact with reasons for conclusions, or appeals." In
sum, the court perceived the delegation of a naked extraordinary power
to make law and to nullify the legislature's enactment. This it could not
uphold.
70. 48 STAT. 881, 884 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78a, c (Supp. 1938). These powers
"have been widely employed in the process of adjusting, by progressive stages, the
operation of the Act to the various classes of securities traded upon exchanges that require different, almost individual treatment". LANDIS, op. cit. supra note I, at 53.
71. 48 STAT. 885, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78e (Supp. 1938).
72. 49 STAT. 811, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79c (Supp. 1938).
73. 200 Atl. 672 (Pa. 1938).
74. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 43, §§ 921-931 (Section 2 (b) was
expressly made inseverable).
75.

".

•

.

no employer shall employ any person for more than forty-four hours in

any one week, or eight hours in any one day. . . ." Id. at § 922.
76. ". . . Provided, That with respect to any industry whose schedule of hours is
established by Federal regulation, the schedule to be fixed by the Department . . .
shall conform to the schedule established by any such Federal regulatory body." This

proviso was also held to contain an invalid delegation. For a convincing argument
upholding its validity, see Brief for Appellants, pp. 148, 149, instant case.

214

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

Starting with the premise that flexibility is desirable in connection with
hours legislation, as with most legislative regulation, and that this may best
be attained by granting a power of variation or dispensation to the administrative,77 it is submitted that, while the court may have reached a
correct result in the instant case, its rationalization was unfortunate in part.
There is good reason for holding here that, if the legislature does not make
provision for adequate safeguards or checks upon the exercise of the discretionary power of dispensation delegated, the entire grant should be considered invalid.71 But, on the basis of judicial and legislative precedent and
practicability, the standard established in Section 2 (b) seems legally
adequate.
In the first place, while it is true that the adequacy of standards may
vary with the subject matter, "unnecessary hardship" and "violation of the
intent and purpose of this Act" have, in other fields, been acceptable as
criteria. Secondly, People v. C. Klinck Packing Co., 79 the only previously
decided case resembling the instant one on its facts, distinctly supports the
sufficiency of these standards, notwithstanding the fact that the instant
court cited it as authority for the contrary proposition. In the Klinck case,
the New York Court of Appeals passed upon two "variation" sections of
a law requiring one day of rest in every seven for certain workers. The
section actually before the court for decision provided that "The Industrial
Board at any time when the preservation,of property, life or health requires, may except specific cases for specified periods from the provisions
of this Act by written orders which shall be recorded as public records."
[Italics supplied.] It is evident that this section is hardly more definite
than that contained in the Pennsylvania act; yet, it was declared constitutional. The court stressed the fact that the Board's power was carefully
"limited in extent and governed by rules prescribed in the statute itself."
On the other hand, as dictum, the court ruled unconstitutional an amended
section which permitted certain exemptions simply "if the commissioner of
labor in his discretion approves." There is the distinction. Patently, if
any part of the Klinck decision should have been given reliance in the
Holgate case, it should have been that dealing with the first section mentioned. But the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited the Klinck case only
for its dictum.
The instant court apparently was not as impressed by legislative precedent as was the United States Supreme Court in Field v. Clark. As far
back as 1917, a Pennsylvania act governing the employment of females
provided that the Industrial Board might "modify" its provisions, in specific cases, "whenever, in the opinion of a majority of . . . the board after
due hearing . . . such modification may be justified and warranted, and

will not result in or tend to the injury of the public health and welfare or
of the health and welfare of the females sought to be affected by such modification." It must be noted, however, that further provisions are made for
filing findings, and for appeals.8 0 Pennsylvania workmen's compensation
legislation also provides for dispensations with meager standards,"' and the
77. See ANDREWS, ADMINISTRATIVE LABOR LEGISLATION (1936)

cc. I, 8.
78. See infra p. 219.
79. 214 N. Y. 121, lo8 N. E. 278 (1915). See ANDREWS, op. cit. supra note 77,
at 177.
8o. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 43, §§ 122-125 (apparently still operative
and unchallenged). In PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 43, § Io3a, the administrative is given the same varying power as to female labor hours as in Holgate v.
Bashore; but here the Act's constitutionality does not depend upon the power's validity.
81. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 77, §§ 447, 501.
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Unemployment Compensation Law provides for8 2 extension of time, in
"proper cases", for the payment of contributions.
Within the few months since the Holgate decision, it has twice been
cited in Pennsylvania as authority for holding the delegation of a dispensing power unconstitutional. Once in the York public utility case, discussed
supra, and very recently in the lower court case of Kellerman v. Philadelphia.8 3 A city ordinance, regulating the hours barber shops may be open,
provided, pursuant to statute, that the director of public health might permit the operation of a particular barber shop beyond the hours prescribed,
"upon proof that barber service to the public so required." This was held
to be an unlawful delegation of legislative power because of the absence
of a guiding standard and of safeguards. It will be interesting to watch
for further developments of this "unconstitutional delegation" epidemic in
Pennsylvania.
It should also be noted that the FairLabor Standards Act of 1938 84
empowers the Administrator to dispense, in certain cases, with the minimum wage requirements of the Act "to the extent necessary in order to
prevent curtailment of opportunities for employment." The validity of
this provision is speculative, since only the Pennsylvania and New York
labor cases can be looked to as authority. On the basis of the non-labor
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, however, this standard,
though very broad, appears adequate.
(f) Zoning Ordinances
The power of dispensation has had its greatest application in connection with zoning ordinances and the case law on the subject is immense.
The Pennsylvania zoning statute,8 5 which is typical of all the rest, provides
that, in the event a zoning ordinance is enacted by a city, a board of adjustment shall be appointed, .which shall have the power ". . . to authorize,
upon appeal, in specific cases, such variance from the terms of the ordinance
as will not be contrary to the public interest, where, owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result
in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be
observed and substantial justice done." [Italics supplied.]
In accordance with this statute, and similar ones in other states, most
zoning ordinances provide for such a board, whose granting of variances
is to be based upon a finding that "practical difficulties" and "unnecessary
hardship" would result from strict enforcement of the ordinance. Moreover, with few exceptions, these provisions have been upheld as against the
contention that they involve an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. 8 The recent Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Huebner V.
PhiladelphiaSaving Fund Society," reasserted the established view of this
state that such provisions are valid; 88 that they set up sufficient standards
and involve the delegation of administrative and not legislative power. The
Illinois Supreme Court took the opposite and minority view in Welton v.
82. PA.

STAT. ANN.

(Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 43, § 785.

83. Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Oct. 27, 1938, p. I, col. I (Pa. C. P. I938).
84. 52 STAT. o6o, i067, io68, 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 201, 213 (a) (7), 214 (Supp. 1938).
85. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 53, §§ 3821, 3829.
86. Sundeen v. Rogers, 83 N. H. 253, 141 Atl. 142 (1928); L. & M. Investment
Co. v. Cutler, 125 Ohio St. 12, i8o N. E. 379 (1932), 38 W. VA. L. Q. 359; SpencerSturla Co. v. Memphis, 155 Tenn. 70, 290 S. W. 6o8 (1927).
87. 127 Pa. Super. 28, 192 Atl. 139 (1937).

88. Junge's Appeal (No. 2), 89 Pa. Super. 548 (1926).
93 Pa. Super. 599, 602 (1928).

See Appeal of Johnson,
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Hamilton8 9 where it held such a delegation to be unconstitutional because
it provided no standard for the guidance of the board.
The zoning statutes and ordinances are usually careful to surround the
dispensing power with various safeguards. Thus, the Pennsylvania statute
provides that the board shall give due notice of hearings, keep minutes of
the proceedings, and that four of the five members of the board must agree
to the variance.9 0 Furthermore, the board's action is subject to judicial
review for failure to exercise its discretion in accordance with the provisions
of the Act.9
(g) Miscellaneous
Health and Safety: The power of dispensation is frequently granted
to an administrative agency by statutes regulating health and safety. For
example, in Pennsylvania, a statute provides that the Commissioner of
Health may permit the discharge of sewage from any sewer system into
waters of the state, otherwise prohibited by the act, whenever the Governor,
Attorney General and Commissioner are of the unanimous opinion "that
the general interests of public health would be subserved thereby." 92 Similarly, the New York Labor Law provides that: "If there shall be practical
difficulties or unnecessary hardship in carrying out provisions . . . affecting the construction or alteration of buildings . . . or the safeguarding of
machinery and prevention of accidents, the board may make a variation
from such requirements if the spirit of the provision . . .shall be observed
and public safety secured." 9- [Italics supplied.] It is of interest that the
statute provides that whenever a variation is decided upon in an individual
case, it shall apply to all cases where the facts are substantially the same
as in the original case.94
Motor Vehicles and Highways: Laws regulating the weight, size and
length of motor vehicles using state highways are numerous. Invariably
they empower the appropriate administrative agency to dispense with the
stated limitations where necessary. These provisions have always been
ultimately sustained.99 In Sproles v. Binford, 6 the United States Supreme
Court said that such a power was administrative in nature and did not
involve an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The general
attitude of the courts with regard to this type of power was summed up
nicely in State v. Wetzel,97 where the Court observed: "It is essential to
the practical administration of such a law that there be some such discretion vested in the highway authorities. It is impossible for the legislature
to anticipate all the very many details and contingencies that may arise in
89. 344 Ill. 82, 176 N. E. 333 (xg3i). For a vitriolic criticism thereof see Freund,
loc. cit. supra note 5.
go. Supra note 85.
91. See Huebner v. Philadelphia Saving Fund Soc., 127 Pa. Super. 28, 37, 192 Atl.
139, 142 (1937). For an adequate discussion of the power of variation in reference to
zoning ordinances, see Note (1931) 16 CORN. L. Q. 579.
92. PA.

STAT. ANN.

(Purdon, 193o) tit. 71, § 540.

See also PA. STAT. ANN.

(Purdon, 193o) tit. 35, § 1225, tit. 53, § 4158.
93. N. Y. CONSoL. LAWS (Cahill, Supp. 1937) c. 32, § 30.
94. See also Chicago v. Marriotto, 332 Ill. 44, 163 N. E. 369 (1928) (power to
dispense with traffic rules in "emergencies" upheld).
95. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S.374 (1932) ; Contract Cartage Co. v. Morris, 59
F. (2d) 437 (E. D. Ill. 1932) (the criterion "emergency" is sufficiently definite); Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Comm., 247 Ky. 144, 56 S. W. (2d) 691 (1932); State
v. Wetzel, 208 Wis. 6o3, 243 N. W. 768 (1932). See PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Ann.
1931) tit. 75, § 455 (stated limitations may be exceeded, in the discretion of administrative upon "good cause being shown").
96. 286 U. S.374 (1932).
97. 2o8 Wis. 603, 243 N. W. 768 (1932).
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the handling of such a complex problem as regulating traffic upon the public
highways."
Protection of Consumers from Misbranding and Short Weight: The
validity of a section of the federal Food and Drug Act, which provided that
reasonable variations,tolerances and exemptions as to small packages should
be permitted by the administrative in connection with a requirement that
the quantities of the contents of a package be conspicuously marked on its
outside, was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co. 9 8 And it was recognized in Petersen
Baking Co. v. Bryan,9 that the Nebraska Legislature might empower the
Secretary of Agriculture to prescribe reasonable tolerances or variations in
excess of the weights, fixed by statute, within which all loaves of bread
should be baked.
Governmental Relations with Employees: As might well be expected
broad grants of dispensing powers have been consistently upheld in this
field. Under both the N. I. R. A. and A. A. A. the Executive was empowered to make appointments necessary for administering the Acts, without regard to civil service qualifications.10 0 A statute has been upheld permitting the dispensation, after public hearings, of an examination where'
such would be "impracticable on account of the temporary character of the
employment or for special reasons satisfactory to the commission...."
The court declared that this would be the performance of an executive and
,ministerialduty by the Commission, and not a legislative one.101 Another
act reducing state employees' salaries according to specified percentages
was held to be constitutional even though it authorized a board to relieve
against full 10reduction
in cases of special fitness, experience, ability and de2
pendability.
Agricultural Adjustment Act: Under this Act the Secretary of Agriculture was given a number of dispensing powers, including the power to
lower the processing tax rate fixed by statute, and the power to exempt
from the tax altogether. The standards set up seemed very specific and
definite.10 3 Notwithstanding, the delegations were held to be invalid by
two of three lower federal courts which passed upon them. 04
98. 287 U. S. 77 (1932). "That the legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated is of course clear." Id. at 85. Cf. Taft, C. J., in the Hampton case (1928),
mipra p. 208, and Cardozo, J., in the Norwegian Nitrogen case (1933), supra note 41.
The instant court considered the power to be administrative and its effect to be "legitimate, namely, to prevent the embarrassment and hardship which might result from a
too literal and minute enforcement of the act, without at the same time offending
against its purposes". For a somewhat similar provision, see § 3 of the Customs AdininistrativeAct of 1938, 52 STAT. 1077, 19 U. S. C. A. § 1304 (Supp. 1938).
99. 124 Neb. 464, 247 N. W. 39 (1933), affd on other grounds, 290 U. S. 570
(1934).
100. 48 STAT. X183 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. §702 (a) (Supp. 1938) ; 48 STAT. 37
(1933), 7 U. S. C. A. § 61o (a) (Supp.1938).
Ioi. State ex reL. Buell v. Frear, 146 Wis. 291, 131 N. W. 832 (IgII). Cf. PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit.
53, §3328.
102. State ex reL Thomas v.Hoss, 143 Ore. 41, 21 P. (2d) 234 (1933).
103. See §§ 9 (b), 15 (a)& (b) of the Act. 48 STAT. 31 (1933), 7 U. S. C. A.
§ 6oi et seq. (Supp. 1938).
1O4. Butler v. United States, 78 F. (2d) i (C. C. A. 1st, 1935), rev'., Franklin
Process Co. v. Hoosac Mills Corp., 8 F. Supp. 552 (D. Mass. 1934) ; Larabee Flour
Mills Co.v.Nee, 12 F. Supp. 395 (W. D. Mo.1935). The Butler decision was affirmed
in United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936), but the point in question was not discussed.
For other applications of the dispensing power see United States v. Chemical
Foundation, 272 U. S. 1 (1926) (war) ; FREUND, op. cit supra note 9,at 133, 527 (immigration).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The value of most types of study usually depends upon the conclusions
drawn therefrom. In the instant case, however, conclusions may act as an
Achilles heel, and without good purpose. To resolve satisfactorily the
multitude of problems necessarily involved in a power of such vast scope
and implication, much more should be known of the dispensing power than
that which has been presented herein. The place of this power in the scheme
of administrative powers has been broadly sketched, but no attempt has
been made to study the fashion in which constitutionally delegated dispensing powers have been exercised. Is there a tendency to abuse the power,
or to use it wisely? This question, all important when considering standards, safeguards and other matters of policy, can find answer only in further study. Moreover, a well painted picture of the dispensing power must
take into consideration the question of administrative finality. Professor
Dickinson has demonstrated that the courts are more prone to accept administrative determinations as final in reference to some fields of governmental action than in others.10 5 Does this attitude also vary with different
kinds of administrative powers? If so, what is the general feeling as regards the power of dispensation? Further investigation alone can give the
answer.
The following tentative conclusions, however, are submitted: The administrative power of dispensation is a necessary adjunct to regulative
legislation, inasmuch as it is the most practical device for relaxing a law
in exceptional cases where rigid enforcement might produce undesirable
results. With Professor Freund apparently dissenting, 06 it is submitted
that use of the dispensing power should generally be encouraged, particularly since specific statutory exemptions are obviously inadequate substitutes for this power which is intended to take care of the unforseeable. In
apparent recognition of this fact, the dispensing power, in its guises as a
power of exemption, variation and extension, has long been delegated by
legislatures in varied factual situations. Generally, but not without notable
exceptions, such delegations have been upheld. Great confusion, however,
has resulted from indiscriminate judicial use of conflicting theories as bases
for decisions. Eventually, the validity of administrative powers will probably be recognized without recourse to fiction. However, present requirements of standards and safeguards undoubtedly will and should be continued.
The United States Supreme Court has never invalidated a dispensing
power, nor have most states; but in Pennsylvania the situation is somewhat different. In connection with zoning ordinances, Pennsylvania has
upheld the power. Furthermore, revenue, health, safety, motor vehicle and
certain public utility powers of dispensation have gone unchallenged. In
reference, however, to maximum hours legislation and securities registration, the power has been declared unconstitutional. The securities decision
may be rationalized on the ground that no standard was established, but
not so in the maximum hours situation, where the stated criterion was no
less vague than in most constitutional delegations. The explanation may
be that where legislative regulation affects a large group, and its subject
matter is not very limited in scope, (e. g., the maximum hours as opposed
to the zoning situation), rendering vigilance by members of the group comparatively ineffective, a court will hesitate to uphold a wide dispensing
IO5. DICxiNsoN, loc. cit. supra note I.
io6. See FREUND, loc. cit. supra note 9.

NOTES
power unless there are added restrictions. The cases as a whole apparently
support this theory.
Generally, only broad standards should be required as regards the dispensing power; detailed standards would often checkmate the purpose of
this power.10 7 Safeguards, however, should be more numerous and detailed
than in the case of other powers. Even the validity of a given delegation
should depend upon the stringency of the safeguards provided. Public hearings, written findings and judicial review of grants and denials of dispensation, should be included among the prescribed restraints on the exercise
of this power. Of course, standard and safeguard requirements may vary
with the field of operation. Above all, the granting of dispensations should
not be immune from careful scrutiny and criticism on the ground that it is
a matter of grace. Economic and other considerations point to the basic

unsoundness of such a theory.

A.R.G.
The Pennsylvania Constitutional Requirement of Uniformity in
Taxation
Among the limitations imposed by the Pennsylvania Constitution on
uncontrolled legislative powers over persons and property is that restricting
the arbitrary exercise of the power to tax.
"All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within
the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied
and collected under general laws; . . ." 1
Prior to the approval of the instant provision in 1873, there had been no
express constitutional restriction on the power to tax 2 other than the fundamental requirement that a special tax could not be levied which would violate man's indefeasible right to possess and protect property." The present
provision purposed to abolish the imposition of a special tax favoring one
class at the expense of another. 4 However, the framers of the present Constitution refused to include therein a separate provision prohibiting "special
taxes", in general, thereby
5 indicating a desire not to unduly limit the scope
of the legislative power.
Since the uniformity provision expressly recognizes the power to
classify,6 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has been very liberal in permitting general classifications of the subject matter of the tax.7 In this
107. Cf. LANDIS, op. cit. supra note I, at 47-52.
I. PA. CoNsT. art. IX, § I. The remaining provisions of this section, permitting
the exemption of certain property from taxation, will not be discussed in this Note.
2. EASTMAN, TAXATION IN PENNSYLVANIA (I909)

19.

3. Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. 352, 363 (1871) ; Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa.
146 (1869).
4. EASTMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 21; WHITE, CommENTARmS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA (1907) 373.
5. 7 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA
(1873) 666.
6. Kittanning Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. 100, 105 (1875).
7. Kitty Roup's Case, 81* Pa. 211 (1874) (classification of rural and urban lands);
Kittanning Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. IOO (1875) (coal mining companies
taxed separately) ; Germania Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Commonwealth, 85
Pa. 513 (1877) (tax on the premiums received by foreign insurance companies and not
local insurance companies) ; Commonwealth v. Germania Brewing Co., 145 Pa. 83, 22
At. 240 (189) (brewing companies classified separately and subjected to capital stock
tax); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 274 Pa. 448, i18 Atl. 394 (1922), aff'd, 260 U. S.
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respect, little is added to the limitations already imposed by the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." However, in applying the
uniformity requirement to the various types of taxes, the Court has imposed
restrictions which are not contained in the Fourteenth Amendment,9 and
which themselves vary with the nature of the tax involved. Under such
circumstances, an examination of the cases interpreting the provision must
be directed with regard to the type of tax imposed. Unfortunately, the
Constitutional Debates fail to reveal whether the requirements were intended to apply solely to the ordinary property tax or to all taxes: °
Mercantile License Tax
The mercantile license tax cases involve the imposition of license taxes
upon persons engaged in certain businesses within a city. Here, classification for tax purposes varies both as to the type of business involved and,
within a class, as to the given volume of sales. In Williamsport v. Wenner,"x the amount of the tax increased at a uniform ratio with each succeeding class of sales. It was held that the unequal application of the tax to
various sums between the minimum and maximum amounts of each class
was not violative of the constitutional requirement of uniformity since all
that is required is approximate uniformity and equality.' 2 In Commonwealth z. Clark,'5 the tax, while increasing in amount, decreased in ratio
as the value of the sales increased. Thus, the tax not only lacked equality
within the class but also bore more heavily on the small dealer since the
rate, in effect, was regressive. However, the tax was upheld on the theory
that the regressive rate was no more unequal than the variation in burden
within each class in the Wenner case. However, an exemption extended to
contractors whose business agents transacted less than one thousand dollars'
worth of business was held invalid inasmuch as they were taxed in the same
manner as other businesses where their sales exceeded the exemption.
In the following year, the Court, for the first time, emphasized the distinction between a tax on the property of the merchants and one based on
their privilege of doing business.' 4 The necessity for this distinction, in
the Court's mind, is apparent from the opinion of the lower court where
it was declared that "a tax levied on the property generally of all merchants
in a city estimated by the amount of their annual sales in their business
could not be 'uniform on the same class of subjects'." '5 However, the
Court proceeded to hold that a tax on the privilege of doing business
measured by gross sales is uniform "within the requirements of the Constitution." 16 In other words, the uniformity clause was held applicable to
245 (1922) (anthracite and bituminous coal classified) ; Commonwealth v. Girard Life
Insurance Co., 3o5 Pa. 558, 158 Atl. 262 (1932) (tax on gross premiums of stock insurance companies; mutual companies exempted) ; National Transit Co. v. Boardman, 328
Pa. 450, 197 Atl. 239 (1938) (classification of corporations to permit the filing of a
consolidated income tax return).
8. Commonwealth v. Girard Life Insurance Co., 305 Pa. 558, 158 Atl. 262 (1932).
9. Cf. Shaeffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920) (sustaining the Oklahoma graduated
income tax).
IO. E. g., a mercantile license tax was in effect at the time. See Commonwealth
v. Clark, 195 Pa. 634, 642, 46 Atl. 286, 289 (igoo).
II. 172 Pa. 173, 33 Atl. 544 (1896).
12. Id. at 182, 33 AtI. at 548.
13. 195 Pa. 634, 46 At!. 286 (igoo), aff'd sub nor. Clark v. Titusville, 184 U. S.
(graduated
329 (19Ol); cf. Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550 (935)
gross sales tax violates equal protection clause).
14. Knisely v. Cotterel, 196 Pa. 614, 46 Atl. 861 (19oo).
15. 196 Pa. 614, 617.
16. Id. at 630, 46 Atl. at 863.
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both property and excise taxes but the requirements of uniformity were
regarded as different in respect to the two types of taxes.
Thus, the uniformity clause did not prevent the mercantile license tax
from varying in rate with each classified amount of sales nor from imposing an unequal burden within each class of sales, but it did prevent the
exemption of one class of merchants where their sales amounted to less
than a stipulated value.
Capital Stock Tax
Pursuant to the Act of 1879, Pennsylvania levied a capital stock tax
with both the method of stock valuation and the rate of the tax being determined by the amount of the dividends paid plus profits transferred to the
sinking fund. Should this total amount to less than six per cent. of the
par value of the stock, a flat three mill tax was levied on an assessed valuation of the stock; if the amount was more than six per cent., a tax at the
rate of one-half a mill per per cent. dividend paid or profit transferred to
the sinking fund was levied on the par value of the stock. While it was
argued that neither the method of valuation nor the rate of tax was uniform,
as had been the situation in previous cases,17 the Court held in Commonwealth v. Brush Electric Light Co.,18 that the tax was uniform since the
method of valuation was applied uniformly within each class. While it
was recognized that the rate was graduated, the point was not discussed.
Apparently, the Court felt that this was a method of taxing the stock according to its value. It is true that the value of the stock may have increased as the dividends increased so that the total tax might approximate
that imposed at a flat rate on the increasing value. Nevertheless, the tax
was in form graduated and undoubtedly imposed unequal burdens. 9 It is
significant that the language of the opinion 20 would have permitted a similar
tax determined by net earnings rather than dividends paid, which would
have been, in effect, a graduated income tax. Moreover, since the capital
stock tax has always been construed as a property tax, 21 the Court is here
upholding a graduated tax on property, which is imposing an unequal
burden within a class.
Inheritance Tax
In Cope's Estate,2 2 a flat two per cent. direct inheritance tax was held
unconstitutional since all estates of less than five thousand dollars were
exempted. Although the power to classify under the uniformity clause was
recognized, it was declared that a classification based solely on a difference
in quantity was void. Thus, the result is consistent, at least on the exemption point, with that of the Clark case already discussed.23 Although find17. See argument of appellant, Commonwealth v. Brush Electric Light Co., 145 Pa.
147,

'53 (1891).

18. 145 Pa. 147, 22 Atl. 844 (i8gi), dismissed on appeal, 154 U. S. 496 (1893).
19. Although the dividends may be less than six per cent, the value of the stock
may be assessed at more than par, while even though the dividends are more than six
per cent., the value of the stock may be less than par.
20. Commonwealth v. Brush Electric Light Co., 145 Pa. 147, 155, 22 Atl. 844, 845
(1891). "Why the net earnings were not adopted as the proper measure of value,
instead of so much of them as may be divided or carried to the sinking fund, it is not
material to inquire."
21. Commonwealth v. Standard Oil Co., 1O Pa. 119 (1892) ; Fox's Appeal, 112 Pa.
337, 4 Atl. 149 (1886); RUSLANDER AND MAIN, PENNSYLvANIA CoRPORATIoN TAXES
(3d ed. 1933) 61, 62.
22. 19i Pa. I, 43 Atl. 79 (1899).

23. 195

Pa. 634, 46 Atl. 286 (19oo).
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ing the tax to be imposed on the property rather than on the privilege of
succession, the Court indulged in a dictum to the effect that the Constitutional provision that "all taxes shall be uniform" applied to taxes of every
description. However, in Knowles's Estate24 there is another dictum indi-

25
cating that on the basis of Knisely v. Cotterel, the uniformity provision
26
does not apply to excise taxes. However, the Knisely case, while recogproperty
between
uniformity
for
nizing a distinction in the requirements
and privilege taxes, specifically applied the uniformity provisions to a privilege tax. Furthermore, five years after Knowles's case, the Pennsylvania
Court, in considering the method of valuing an annuity subject to the inheritance tax, held that the uniformity clause was violated unless the annuity
was valued on the basis of the mortality tables rather than on the basis of
2
the actual life of the annuitant who died prior to the assessment of the tax. 7
While it was not necessary to invoke the uniformity clause here since the
problem was one of statutory construction, the case is indicative of the
Court's tendency to apply the clause to inheritance taxes. This is further
indicated by a dictum in Kelley v. Kalodner to the effect that "even if we
assume a graduated income tax is not a property tax, but instead an excise
tax, as contended by the defendants, it is by no means clear that it would
not fall within the constitutional requirements as to uniformity." 28 The
excise tax in a recent deciuniformity clause was also applied to an obvious
29

sion upholding the Philadelphia sales tax.

This question of whether the uniformity provision is applicable to
80
inheritance taxes, now construed as privilege rather than property taxes,
the
for
provides
1937
which
becomes important in considering the Act of
apportionment of the additional "estate" tax under the Act of 1927, as well
as the Federal Estate Tax, among the persons interested in the estate except
31
In Knowles's Estate,32
where the testator directs otherwise in his will.
the Court was faced with a similar apportionment provision when it conPa. 571, 145 Atl. 797 (1929).
25. 196 Pa. 614, 46 Atl. 861 (igoo).

24. 295

26. Supra note 14.

27. Rowell's Estate, 315 Pa. x81, 186, 173 Atl. 634, 637 (1934).
28. 320 Pa. 18o, 187, 181 Atl. 598, 602 (1935), 84 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 427 (1936).
29. Wilson v. Philadelphia, 330 Pa. 350, 198 Ati. 893 (1938).
30. Knowles's Estate, 295 Pa. 571, 589, 145 AtI. 797, 803 (1929).

31. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 20, § 844. "Whenever it appears
upon any accounting or in any appropriate action or proceeding that an executor . . .
or other person acting in a fiduciary capacity, has paid an estate tax, levied or assessed
under the provisions of the act, approved the seventh day of May, one thousand nine
hundred and twenty-seven . . . or under any law hereafter enacted, or under the
provisions of any estate tax law of the United States heretofore or hereafter enacted
upon or with respect to any property required to be included in the gross estate of a
decedent under the provisions of any such law, the amount of the tax so paid, except
in a case where a testator otherwise directs in his will, shall be equitably prorated
among the persons interested in the estate to whom such property is or may be transferred, or to whom any benefit accrues. . . . For the purposes of this section, the
term 'persons interested in the estate' shall, with respect to both State and Federal
taxes, include all persons who may be entitled to receive or who have received any
property or interest which is required to be included in the gross estate of a decedent
whether under a will or intestacy, or by reason of any transfer, trust..
See Jeffery's Estate, 32 Pa. D. & C. 5 (938), holding that this statute applies to every
case pending in which a final decree of distribution was not entered at the effective
date of the Act. The constitutional question was not raised.
32. 295 Pa. 571, 145 Atl. 797 (1929) ; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit.
72, § 2303. The apportionment provision was originally part of the Act of 1927, but it
was repealed by the Act of 1929. Pa. Laws 1929, p. 1782.
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sidered the constitutionality of the Act of 1927 which had taken advantage
of the eighty per cent. allowance under the Federal Estate Tax. The lower
court Il in finding the apportionment provision unconstitutional, declared
that it was an unreasonable classification of individual legatees to differentiate between legacies of the same value because of the varying values of
the entire estates. But in upholding the additional Pennsylvania tax in
the form of a credit against the federal tax, it expressly held that the uniformity clause did not apply to privilege taxes. The unconstitutionality of
the apportionment provision purportedly was based upon the fundamental
rule that classifications must not be arbitrary. However, it is evident that
the lower Court applied a different rule of uniformity to an excise tax than
to an ordinary property tax. The Supreme Court refused to pass upon
the constitutionality of the Act inasmuch as the plaintiffs, as residuary
legatees, were not damaged since, in any event, they were obliged to pay
the federal tax.34 However, the Supreme Court suggested that the tax
might be sustained on the ground that it was not based on a graded classification but merely upon a reasonable classification of estates into a class
consisting of those estates in which the federal tax was more than twenty
per cent. greater than the state tax.35 Conceding the validity of such a
classification, the rate of the tax within that class would not be equal for
the state tax, in the form of a rebate, would progressively increase with
the graduated federal rate. However, since the apportionment provision in
the Act of 1937 " includes the federal tax as well as the additional state
tax, it might be argued that the individual legatees cannot protest the additional state tax since, in any event, the federal tax could not be avoided.
However, still unanswered is the objection of the lower court that it is
unconstitutional to impose upon a specific legatee a tax varying with the
value of the total estate.
Income Tax
With regard to income taxes, the problem of the applicability of the
uniformity clause to the excise tax again is a significant one. In Kelley v.
Kalodner, in holding unconstitutional the graduated personal income tax
with certain exemptions, the Court evaded the issue in finding the tax to
be a property tax, at least insofar as it was levied on income derived from
property whether real or personal.3 7 It is not clear whether the tax was
regarded as upon the income as property or upon the property from which
the income was derived. Left undecided was the question of whether earned
income is property. However, a few months later, the court sustained a
flat six per cent. tax on business associations for the privilege of doing business within the state measured by their annual net earnings which included
income from all sources.38 Here, the language of the Court indicated that
the subject matter of the tax was the income rather than the source from
which it was derived and thus that all income was property.39 If this be
33. Knowles's Estate, ii Pa. D. & C. 621 (1929).
34. Knowles's Estate, 295 Pa. 571, 145 AtI. 797 (1929).
35. Id. at 589-590, 145 Atl. at 8o3.

36. Supra note 31.
37. 320 Pa. i8o, 18i AtI. 598 (935).
38. Turco Paint & Varnish Co. v. Kalodner et al., 320 Pa. 421, 184 At. 37 (936).
39. Id. at 426, 184 Atl. at 4o. "It certainly should be axiomatic that the same impost when applied to the same subject-matter does not make the tax graded simply
because of the fact that one association, owning more of the particular taxable subjectmatter than another, pays on this account, a greater sum total of tax." This would
seem effectively to overrule the much cited case of Banger's Appeal, 3O9 Pa. 79 (885),
which held that a net income tax was invalid since it did not operate equally on all
persons within a class.
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so, then a tax on earned income would be designated a property tax and
invalidated under the prohibitions of the Kelley case should it contain
graduations in rate or allow exemptions. However, having expressly left
the question open, 0 it is possible that the Court later may find the tax on
earned income to be an excise tax and thus sustain a graduated rate on the
authority of the Clark case 41 and the dictum in Knowles's Estate, 2 although
the implication of a corporate income tax case was that a graduated rate
would be bad.43 It would seem that the early capital stock case 4 4 would
be authority for permitting a graduated rate whether in the form of a property or an excise tax. It is clear, however, that no matter in which category
an exemption merely
the income tax falls, no authority exists for permitting
45
because the income falls below a certain amount.
Specific Tax Per Unit of Property
If terminology employed is to influence the determination of the validity
of a tax,4 6 logically, the Court should reveal the considerations involved in
discovering the tax to be an excise or property tax. However, in the recent
case of Commonwealth v. A. Overholt & Co.,47 the Court seized upon the
admission of the Commonwealth, in its oral argument, that a floor tax of
two dollars per gallon was a property tax and, without further discussion,
held the tax violative of the uniformity clause inasmuch as it bore no relation to the value of the property. Since the Court has sustained as uniform
an additional tax upon the corporate franchises of coal mining companies
at the rate of three cents per ton of coal mined or purchased regardless of
its value, 48 the practical and economic results of the two cases appear inconsistent. The judicial distinction 4 9 is purely a formal one in that the tax
in the coal mining case was found to be on the privilege of mining measured
by the units mined rather than on the property itself as in the floor tax
case. 50 However, if the floor tax had been levied with some reasonable
regard for the value of the liquor,5 it is well settled
52 that isolated instances
of unequal burden would not invalidate the tax.
4o. Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. i8o, at 191, 18i At. 598, at 6o3 (1935).
41. Commonwealth v. Clark, 195 Pa. 634, 46 Atl. 286 (igoo), aff'd sub nora., Clark
v. Titusville, 184 U. S. 329 (19O1).
42. 295 Pa. 571, 145 At. 797 (1929).
43. Turco Paint & Varnish Co. v. Kalodner et al., 320 Pa. 421, 184 Atl. 37 (1936).

44. Commonwealth v. Brush Electric Light Co., 145 Pa. 147, 22 At1. 844 (1891),
dismissed on appeal, 154 U. S. 496 (1893).
45. Commonwealth v. Clark, 195 Pa. 634, 46 AtI. 286 (19oo).
46. "Where a specific tax of a fixed amount is imposed, regardless of value, the
validity of the tax depends on whether the tax is a property tax or an occupation tax.
If the former, it violates the rule as to equality and uniformity; if the latter, it does
not." I COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 297, n. 77.
47. 331 Pa. 182, 2oo Atl. 849 (1938).
48. Kittanning Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. IOO (1875).

49. Id. at 104.
5o. It is of course recognized that, even if the tax had been levied on the privilege
of keeping a warehouse measured by the number of gallons in store between certain

dates, the Court might hold that this was still a property tax. Cf. Dawson v. Kentucky
Distilleries Co., 255 U. S. 288 (I92I), where a tax of fifty cents per gallon levied in

the form of an annual license tax on the removal of whiskey from bond was held a
property tax, since it was based solely on an act of ownership rather than on the privilege of owning and storing whiskey.
51. The Court emphasized the fact that "the values of the liquors were deliberately
and systematically disregarded". Commonwealth v. A. Overholt & Co., 331 Pa. 182,
192, 20o Atl. 849, 853 (1938).
52.

Commonwealth v. Delaware Div. Canal Co., 123 Pa. 594, 16 Atl. 584 (188)

(corporate obligations subjected to a personal property tax on their par value regardless of actual value); Commonwealth v. Brush Electric Light Co., 145 Pa. 147, 22 AtI.
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Conclusion
In retrospect, reconciliation of the various interpretations of the Pennsylvania uniformity clause would appear futile. However, the opinion may
be ventured that the Pennsylvania Court has applied more stringent requirements with regard to "property taxes", in general, than to other types of
taxes although the distinction has not been conclusively passed upon in the
most recent cases. Although provisions of other state constitutions may
provide authoritative bases for such a distinction,58 aside from historical
justification, little support for it may be derived from the language of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Perhaps, contemporary economic considerations would justify such a result.54 If this be the position of the Pennsylvania Court, it would seem that, in addition to the limitations of the "equal
protection clause" of the Federal Constitution, the most patent restriction
imposed by the Pennsylvania uniformity provisions would be the prohibition
of graduated taxes on income derived from property and the possibility that
exemptions based solely on amount may be nullified irrespective of the
nature of the tax imposed.
R.C.P.
844 (i89i), discussed supra note ig; Commonwealth v. Mortgage Trust Co., 227 Pa.
163, 76 Atl. 5 (igio) (capital stock valued at a proportion of the total capital paid in,
surplus and undivided profits, rather than at market value). See also the mercantile
license tax cases cited supra notes io, ii.
53. "Taxes shall be levied and collected for public purposes only and shall be uniform upon all property of the same class subject to taxation within the territorial limits
of the authority levying the tax; and all taxes shall be levied and collected by general
laws." Ky. CoNsT. § 171. "The general assembly may, by general laws only, provide
for the payment of license fees on franchises, stock used for breeding purposes, the various trades, occupations, and professions, or a special or excise tax; and may, by general
laws, delegate the power to counties, towns, cities, and other municipal corporations,
to impose and collect license fees on stock used for breeding purposes, on franchises,
trades, occupations and professions." Ky. CoNsT. § 181. See Trimble, Excise Taxes
and the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution of Kentucky, 25 Ky. L. J. 343 (1937).
"The General Assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needful by levying a
tax, by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to
the value of his, or her or its property-such value to be ascertained by some person or
persons, to be elected or appointed in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct,
and not otherwise; but the General Assembly shall have power to tax . . . (certain
enumerated occupations) and persons or corporations owning or using franchises and
privileges, in such manner as it shall from time to time direct by general law, uniform
as to the class upon which it operates." ILL. CoNsT. art. IX, § i. "The specification of
the objects and subjects of taxation shall not deprive the General Assembly of the
power to require other subjects or objects to be taxed in such manner as may be consistent with the principles of taxation fixed in this Constitution." ILL. CoNsT. art. IX,
§ 2. See Note, The Illinois Constitutional Requirement of Uniformity in Taxation
(1938) 33 ILL. L. REv. 58.

54. Brock, A Graduated Income Tax and the Pennsylvania Constitution (1935)

9 TEmP. L. Q. 263.

